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below, with the exception of United Park City Mines Company, a Delaware corporation,
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Judgment was entered by the District Court on May 10, 2004. Plaintiffs filed their
Notice of Appeal on May 20, 2004. On May 26, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred this
case to the Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a3(2)0) (2004).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that all of the
Plaintiffs' claims were barred by res judicata following reversal on appeal of an award of
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, where the matter had been initially presented on
cross motions for summary judgment. (R. 714-718; Tr. (R. 722) pp. 8-11,20-21, and 30-31.)
Standard of review: Whether the District Court correctly applied the doctrine
of res judicata presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Grynberg v.
Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 7 (Utah 2003); Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663,
670 (Utah 2002).
2. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Court of
Appeals precluded further factual and legal determinations as to issues not foreclosed by the
decision on appeal when the District Court had ruled in favor of Plaintiffs on cross motions
for summary judgment, followed by reversal and remand for further proceedings consistent
with the Court of Appeals' decision. (R. 714-718; 616-623; 633-638; 661-692.)
1

Standard of review: Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the Court
of Appeals decision presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Amax
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com fn., 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994).
3. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in entering judgment quieting title
in the Mayflower Defendants (collectively "Mayflower"), where Mayflower filed an answer
to the complaint in the Plaintiffs' quiet title action but did not assert a counterclaim. (R. 446451; Tr.(R. 722) pp. 21-31.)
Standard of review: This issue is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness. Avemco Ins. Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 998, 999 (10th Cir. 1993); see
Republic Health Corp. v. LifemarkHospitals of Florida, Inc., 755 F.2d 1453,1454 (11th Cir.
1985).

STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING STATUTES ETC.
Plaintiffs are not aware of any statutes, rules, etc., the interpretation of which is
determinative of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a quiet title action brought by Robert W. Dunlap and Kathy L. Dunlap
(collectively the "Dunlaps") against the Defendants Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds
of Mijdrecht and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds of Mijdrecht (collectively
2

"Mayflower") and others. (R. 1-8.) The subject of the action is a patented mining claim
known as Marsac Lode, Lot Number 61 (the "Marsac Lode") in Summit County, Utah. (R.
6.) The Dunlaps' chain of title derives from a sheriffs deed issued in a 1941 foreclosure
action whereby title to the Marsac Lode was vested in the Dunlaps' predecessor-in-interest.
(R. 114-403.)
Mayflower filed an Answer to the Complaint but did not assert a counterclaim. (R.
446-451.) Mayflower asserts an ownership interest in the Marsac Load through a series of
conveyances that go back to a Nevada corporation that owned and deeded away the Marsac
Lode prior to the foreclosure. (R. 397; 421-442.) More than thirty years after the foreclosure
action, the Marsac Lode was included with more than 200 other patented mining claims on
an exhibit to a deed from the Nevada corporation to Mayflower's predecessor-in-interest.
(R. 133-165; 397.)
In 1939, the real property taxes on the Marsac Lode were assessed to the Dunlaps'
predecessor-in-interest, International Smelting, and have continued to be assessed to
International Smelting (or its successor-by-merger) every year thereafter until International
Smelting conveyed the Marsac Lode to AMI Associates in 1987. (R. 166-288; 397-98.)
From 1987 to 1992, AMI Associates paid all real property taxes on the Marsac Lode.
The Dunlaps have paid all real property taxes from 1993 to the present. (R. 166-288; 39798.) The ownership plats of Summit County show the Dunlaps as the fee simple owners of
the Marsac Lode. (R. 401.) Prior to a title search conducted on behalf of the Plaintiffs in
3

June 2000, and the subsequent commencement of this quiet title action, the Dunlaps were
unaware that Mayflower claimed an interest in the Marsac Load. (R. 487.)
Earlier in these proceedings the Dunlaps and United Park City Mines (collectively the
"Plaintiffs") moved for summary judgment, without discovery, on the basis of the Dunlaps'
chain of record title, and also on theories of estoppel and adverse possession. (R. 111-113;
114-418.) Mayflower filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 421-423.) The facts
and issues relative to the record title centered around the efficacy of the judicial foreclosure
in 1941 and the resulting sheriffs deed from which the Dunlaps traced their chain of title.
(R. 114-418.) The parties submitted the available documentary evidence pertaining to the
judicial foreclosure and its aftermath and indicated to the District Court that discovery on that
subject would not likely be fruitful. (R. 579.) The Plaintiffs also submitted limited affidavit
testimony to support their legal theories of estoppel and adverse possession. (R. 484-489.)
The District Court granted the Plaintiffs summaryjudgment on the basis of record title
and estoppel, but denied summary judgment on adverse possession. The District Court also
denied Mayflower's cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 578-582.)
Mayflower appealed the District Court's ruling, and this Court reversed. This Court
ruled that:

(1) the sheriffs deed to the Dunlaps' predecessor pursuant to the 1941

foreclosure was ineffective under the recording statute in effect at the time (Utah R.S. § 78-33 (1933)); and (2) the evidence presented to the court below was insufficient to support
summary judgment on estoppel. The operative language of this Court's order on appeal was
4

as follows: "[W]e reverse the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to the
Dunlaps. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." (R. 595-599;
2003 UT App. 283 (Aug. 7, 2003) at 8.)
Following denial by the Supreme Court of a petition for writ of certiorari, the Dunlaps
filed a motion in the District Court for a pre-trial conference to set a schedule for discovery
and further proceedings on the issues remaining after the appeal. (R. 613-615; 616-623.)
The Dunlaps asserted that the appeal left open three principal issues for further adjudication:
(1)

Whether the Dunlaps acquired title to the Marsac Lode by adverse possession;

(2)

Whether Mayflower may claim the benefits of the Utah Recording Statute as
a good faith purchaser for value; and

(3)

Whether Mayflower should be estopped from asserting superior title.

(R. 618; 633-638; 661-692.)
Mayflower opposed the motion for pre-trial conference and requested the District
Court to enter judgment immediately in its favor. (R. 629-632.) Mayflower also filed a
petition for writ of mandamus asking this Court to compel the District Court to enter
judgment. The petition was denied. (R. 693A-693D; 2004 Ut App. 126.)
The District Court held a hearing on April 26, 2004 to consider whether to conduct
further proceedings or enter judgment in favor of Mayflower. (R. 657-660; 722.) Prior to
the hearing, the Dunlaps submitted an affidavit from Robert Dunlap containing evidence on
adverse possession that had not been presented in the earlier proceedings. (R. 687-692.)
5

The District Court ruled that the Dunlaps' claims were barred by this Court' s opinion
on appeal or by res judicata, and the Dunlaps were legally precluded from presenting any
further evidence. (R. 714-718; Tr. (R. 722) pp. 30-31.) The District Court entered judgment
quieting title in favor of Mayflower. (R. 714-718.) This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in concluding that the Dunlaps' claims were barred in their
entirety by res judicata and this Court's decision on the first appeal. This Court's ruling in
the first appeal resolved some issues between the parties, but not all. This Court remanded
the case back to the District Court for further proceedings on the unresolved matters. The
prior decision of this Court was not a final order that had claim preclusive effect under the
doctrine of res judicata.
The first appeal determined that the 1941 foreclosure was defective. This Court also
determined that the District Court erred in granting the Dunlaps summary judgment on the
issue of estoppel on the evidence then before the Court. This Court's ruling in the first
appeal left open important issues, however, that require further adjudication. The Dunlaps'
claim of title by adverse possession has never been judicially determined. There was only
a denial of a motion for summary judgment. The Dunlaps should now be given an
opportunity to present evidence and further legal argument on that issue. The Dunlaps
further assert that Mayflower is estopped to assert superior title to the Marsac Load. This
6

Court's reversal of summary judgment in favor of the Dunlaps on the issue of estoppel has
the effect of sending it back to the District Court for further proceedings. Lastly, this Court
held in the first appeal that the sheriffs deed issued to the Dunlaps' predecessor is not
effective as against a good faith purchaser for value under the Utah Recording Statute. This
Court did not decide that Mayflower qualifies as a good faith purchaser entitled to protection
under the statute. Those matters are all open for further factual and legal development,
consistent with this Court's prior ruling.
The District Court further erred in issuing a decree quieting title to the Marsac Load
in Mayflower in the absence of a counterclaim seeking that relief.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE DUNLAPS9 CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY RES
JUDICATA.

Following the reversal of summary judgment in their favor in the prior appeal, the
Dunlaps sought to conduct discovery and present evidence to the District Court on the factual
and legal issues remaining open after the appeal. The District Court refused to permit the
Dunlaps to go forward, and granted judgment in favor of Mayflower, based in part on the
District Court's conclusion that the Dunlaps' claims were barred by res judicata.

The

District Court misapplied the doctrine of res judicata, and this matter should be reversed for
further proceedings on the remaining issues not resolved by the first appeal.

7

The elements of res judicata claim preclusion may be summarized as follows: (1)
the prior adjudication must have been between the same parties or their privies; (2) the claim
to be precluded must have been presented in the prior action, or should have been presented;
and (3) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Macris & Assoc,
Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2000).
The court below initially granted the Dunlaps summary judgment on two legal
theories, chain of title and estoppel, which was reversed on appeal. The District Court denied
the Dunlaps summary judgment on adverse possession and further denied the Mayflower
motion for summary judgment. The first appeal resolved certain record title issues and
determined that summary judgment on estoppel was not supported by the record as it then
stood. As to the other issues in the case - including the Dunlaps9 claims of superior title
based on adverse possession and estoppel - neither the ruling by the District Court nor the
reversal by this Court constitutes a final judgment on the merits that could have claim
preclusive effect. See, Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1,7 (Utah 2003) (partial
summary judgment did not have preclusive effect); Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc.,
571 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1977) (denial of motion for summary judgment is not a final
order); Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395,397 (Utah 1977) ("[Preliminary
or interim rulings do not rise to the dignity of res judicata or stare decisis

Similarly, the

denial of a motion for summary judgment is not binding upon another division of the court

8

in different circumstances...."); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,1310-1311
(Utah App. 1994) (denial of motion for summary judgment is not a final order).
Nor does the fact that Mayflower filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
transform the District Court's ruling, or the reversal of summary judgment on appeal, into
a final order on the merits that could have claim preclusive effect. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc.
v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Idaho 1994) (reversal of
judgment entered on cross-motions for summary judgment was not a final order, and on
remand the trial court was free to conduct further fact-finding proceedings). The submission
of cross-motions for summary judgment does not preclude the need for subsequent findings
of fact. Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assoc, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981) ("Crossmotions for summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual issues, even though both
parties contend for the purposes of their motions that they are entitled to prevail because
there are no material issues of fact."); Wycalls v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821,824825 (Utah App. 1989) (cross-motions for summary judgment do not mean there can not be
material questions of fact).
Consistent with the above-cited authorities, following the reversal of summary
judgment the District Court was free to conduct further fact-finding and make legal rulings
on any issues that were not passed on by this Court on the first appeal. Thomas v. National
Automobile and Casualty Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 424, 428 (Okla. 1994) ("When on the
judgment's reversal a cause is remanded, it returns to the trial court as if it had never been
9

decided, save only for the 'settled law5 applicable to the case. On remand the parties are
relegated to their prejudgment status."). The District Court therefore erred in ruling that it
was precluded under the doctrine ofresjudicata from considering any of the Dunlaps' claims
on remand.
B.

THIS COURT'S RULING LEFT ISSUES OPEN FOR FURTHER
ADJUDICATION

1. Factual and legal issues remain on the question of adverse possession. In the
first appeal, this Court did not decide whether the Dunlaps did or did not obtain title to the
Marsac Lode by adverse possession. It reversed the award of summary judgment in favor
of the Dunlaps on the basis of record title and estoppel and remanded for further proceedings.
The District Court must still determine to what extent there remain unresolved issues of fact
or law, and resolve the remaining issues consistent with this Court's decision. See, e.g., Stagl
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1997) (trial court properly conducted trial
on the merits following reversal of summaryjudgment in favor of defendant). The Supreme
Court of Wyoming articulated the governing principle of appellate law as follows:
The effect of a general reversal of a summaryjudgment order is to nullify it
completely and to leave the case standing as if such judgment, order, or decree
had never been rendered . . . . Following a complete reversal, the issues are
open to a district court except as qualified by the appellate court.
Lyden v. Winer, 913 P.2d 451,454 (Wyo. 1996); see also, demons v. Mechanical Devices
Co., 781 N.E.2d 1072, 1081 (111. 2002) ("When a decree is reversed and the cause is
remanded without specific directions . . . the trial court may permit amendments to the
10

pleadings or the introduction of further evidence, so long as such steps are not inconsistent
with the principles announced by the court of review.") (citations omitted).
As stated above, the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment that they acquired title
by adverse possession. That motion was denied. The denial of summary judgment on
adverse possession was left undisturbed by this Court's ruling on appeal, and the issue was
remanded to the District Court for appropriate factual and legal determination.
In support of their original summary judgment motion, the Plaintiffs submitted an
affidavit from Hank Rothwell, the president of United Park City Mines Company ("UPCM")
since 1991, who testified to the use of the property so far as he was aware. (R. 484-489.)
At the time of the summary judgment motion and appeal there was no evidence whatever
before the District Court regarding the use of the property during the fifty years between the
foreclosure in 1941 and 1991, when Mr. Rothwell became president of UPCM.
In support of their motion for a pre-trial hearing, the Dunlaps submitted an Affidavit
from Robert Dunlap, describing his knowledge of the Marsac Lode since 1988. (R. 687692.) This evidence was not before the District Court in the earlier proceedings. Among
other things, Mr. Dunlap states as follows:
At all times from at least 1988 to the present, access to the Marsac Lode has been
limited to the Dunlaps, their authorized agents, and to UPCM, which owns the
surrounding land. Access to the property [which is heavily wooded] was controlled

11

by locked gates across the only access roads. No representative of Mayflower is
known to have had access during that time. [Dunlap Affidavit. %f 8-9.]
The claim of ownership of the Dunlaps and their predecessor, AMI, was shown on
numerous public records. [Id. f 10.]
During the period of April 1988 to approximately 1996, AMI or the Dunlaps
conducted mineral sampling on the Marsac Lode. As part of that process, they
marked and flagged each sampling site and analyzed the samplings for development
potential. [Id. f 11.]
In the early 1990's a clearly visible day-camp was established on the Marsac Lode and
used as a staging area for mineral development and for recreational activities. [Id. f
12.]
Mr. Dunlap caused a survey to be conducted on the Marsac Lode in 1990, and the
property boundaries were marked with monuments and survey flags. [Id. f 13.]
Commencing in approximately 1994, the Dunlaps and AMI shifted focus of the
Marsac Lode toward real estate development. They hired an engineering firm to assist
in evaluating alternatives, participated with UPCM in the development of a master
plan for development that was filed with Park City, and conducted environmental
evaluations to assess development potential. [Id. H 14.]
The Marsac Lode, showing either the Dunlaps or AMI as landowners, was included
in a lengthy and complex public annexation process with Park City. [Id. ff 14-15.]
12

Given the opportunity, the Dunlaps expect to adduce further relevant testimony by
deposing individuals who have knowledge of the Marsac Lode pre-dating their own
experience. This additional evidence should be presented to the District Court, after which
the District Court can make an informed ruling on the issue of adverse possession.1
The court below erroneously concluded that the ruling of this Court on the first appeal
mandated quieting title to the Marsac Lode in Mayflower without further proceedings. Had
this Court intended that result, it would have remanded with instructions to enter judgment
in favor of Mayflower. This Court's opinion recites that the case was before the Court "on
appeal from a grant of summary judgment for Plaintiffs." This Court reversed the summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs but did not instruct the District Court to enter judgment
in favor of Mayflower.
As set forth in the Affidavit of Robert Dunlap, there is substantial evidence not
previously considered to support the claim of title by adverse possession. The dispute over
adverse possession centers on whether the Dunlaps can establish that they or their
predecessors "possessed and occupied" the Marsac Lode. The governing statute is Utah

!

The statement by Plaintiffs' counsel in the earlier proceedings that discovery
would not be helpful was made in the context of the summary judgment motions that
focused primarily on the 1941 foreclosure. (Tr. (R. 722) pp. 7-8.) The parties had
gathered all the available documents regarding the foreclosure, and the witnesses were
presumed deceased or otherwise no longer available. The District Court has never
considered testimony from Mr. Dunlap on the issue of adverse possession, and the
Plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to depose available witnesses or obtain documents
bearing on that issue.
13

Code § 78-12-9, which provides that land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied
by one claiming upon a written instrument in any of the following instances, among others:
Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
Where, although not inclosed, it has been used... for the ordinary use of the
occupant. [Utah Code §§ 78-12-9 (2) and (3) (2003).]
The Supreme Court has explained that the essential inquiry is whether "uses were
made of the property which clearly evinced an intention to use and a use inconsistent with
rights in others . . .." Michael v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 9 Utah 2d 370, 345 P.2d 200, 201
(1959). Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has explained the purpose behind the statutory
requirements for adverse possession as follows:
"The purpose underlying this rule is that the 'possession' be of such character
as to plainly manifest that the claimant is asserting ownership of the property
against the owner and the world and to prevent one who may occupy land in
an equivocal or surreptitious manner from using such possession as a basis to
claim title by adverse possession."
Cooper v. Carter Oil Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320, 322 (1957).
Here, the Dunlaps sought an opportunity to present evidence that access to the Marsac
Lode was restricted by locked gates for a period of many years, during which time the
Dunlaps and their predecessors conducted mineral evaluations that left clearly visible
evidence. Later they conducted environmental tests and engineering evaluations for real
estate development. Eventually, the Marsac Lode, showing the Dunlaps or AMI as owners,
was included in an extensive public annexation proceeding with Park City, as part of an over-

14

all development plan. This pattern of use and control was more than sufficient to put
Mayflower on notice of the Dunlaps' claim.
The Supreme Court has also indicated that a relevant consideration in a claim of
adverse possession is the degree to which the record owner was aware of the adverse claim
and did not object. Cooper, 316 P.2d 320,323-24. The Dunlaps seek to conduct discovery
to establish that Mayflower and its predecessors were aware for many years of the adverse
claim by the Dunlaps and their predecessors, and that no challenge was ever raised to the
adverse claim prior to commencement of this quiet title action.
The Dunlaps should be afforded an opportunity to develop the factual record that they
and their predecessors occupied the Marsac Lode in a manner sufficient to acquire title by
adverse possession.
2. Factual and legal issues remain on the question of Mayflower's rights under
the Utah Recording Statute, This Court held on the basis of the Utah Recording Statute
that the Dunlaps' chain of record title cannot prevail over a "subsequent purchaser in good
faith and for a valuable consideration". [Utah R.S. § 78-3-3 (1933).] This Court did not
hold, however, that Mayflower had proven it is entitled to judgment quieting title in its favor,
or that Mayflower - or its predecessor - was a good faith purchaser for value. Further
inquiry into those issues by the District Court is entirely consistent with this Court's opinion.
The record in this case is devoid of any evidence that Mayflower obtained title in good
faith and for valuable consideration. To this point in the litigation, Mayflower has failed to
15

meet its burden of proving it is entitled to the benefits of the Utah Recording Statute. The
issue of whether Mayflower and its predecessors are good faith purchasers first arose when
this Court relied upon the Utah Recording Statute [Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 (2000) and
its predecessors], which requires such a finding before Mayflower may claim the benefits of
the statute.
3.

Factual and legal issues remain on the question of whether Mayflower

should be estopped to claim superior title. A second basis for the initial summary
judgment in favor of the Dunlaps was estoppel. This Court reversed that ruling in footnote
5, which states in relevant part:
The trial court's Findings of Fact include no findings relating to estoppel and
the undisputed facts also do not support estoppel. Furthermore, estoppel is
inconsistent with the trial court's determination that the Dunlaps had not
established adverse possession or waiver. We therefore reverse the trial
court's conclusion that Mayflower is estopped from claiming title.
This Court determined that the initial findings of fact on the issue of estoppel were
insufficient to support summary judgment. The Court's prior ruling leaves open the
possibility for the Dunlaps to develop an evidentiary basis to support a conclusion that
Mayflower is estopped from claiming title. The record on the first appeal primarily dealt
with the 1941 foreclosure. Much of the new evidence in the Dunlap Affidavit bears on the
issue of estoppel, and the Dunlaps desire to depose representatives of Mayflower and perhaps
others on this issue as well.
The Supreme Court has defined the elements of equitable estoppel as follows:
16

(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with
a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken
or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure
to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure
to act.
Nunly v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077,1088 (Utah 1999), quoting, CECO
Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989). The elements of
estoppel are by their very nature fact intensive, and the Dunlaps are entitled to develop a
factual record and present their evidence to the District Court.
Among other things, the Dunlaps will present evidence that they or their predecessorsin-interest paid the taxes on the Marsac Lode ever since the foreclosure in 1941. The
Dunlaps will further seek to establish that during the decades following the foreclosure,
access to the Marsac Lode was blocked by locked gates, but neither Mayflower nor their
predecessors ever complained or sought access. The public land records of Summit County
showed the Dunlaps or their predecessors as owners of record. The Marsac Lode, showing
the Dunlaps or their predecessor, AMI, as owners, was also included in an extended
annexation process with Park City. All the while, Mayflower and its predecessors made no
assertion of right.
The cumulative weight of this evidence - most of which was not before either this
Court or the District Court in the earlier proceedings - would amply support a finding that
Mayflower is estopped from asserting ownership of the subject property.
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C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ISSUING A DECREE
QUIETING TITLE TO THE MARSAC LOAD IN FAVOR OF
MAYFLOWER.

This case originated as a quiet title action brought by the Plaintiffs. The Mayflower
Defendants answered, but did not assert a counterclaim seeking to quiet title in their favor.
(R. 446-451.) Absent a counterclaim, the District Court was not authorized to issue a decree
quieting title to the Marsac Load in Mayflower. Bolognese v. Anderson, 97 Utah 136, 90
P.2d 275,276 (1939) (defendant who did not assert an affirmative claim for quiet title was
not entitled to a decree in its favor). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) provides in relevant
part:
Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Mayflower's claim for a quiet title decree arose out of the subject-matter of the
Plaintiffs' complaint and should have been raised as a compulsory counterclaim. The
Dunlaps have not had an opportunity to assert defenses to Mayflower's claims. Merely
because summary judgment for the Dunlaps on adverse possession was denied by the District
Court does not ipso facto mean that Mayflower is entitled to judgment in its favor. At a
minimum, this Court should reverse the judgment of the court below insofar as it quiets title
in favor of Mayflower.
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CONCLUSION
The decision of this Court on the first appeal left important legal and factual issues
unresolved. The Dunlaps should be permitted to pursue their claim to the Marsac Lode based
on adverse possession and estoppel - matters which were left open following the first appeal.
The District Court erred in holding that the Dunlaps were precluded from pursuing those
claims. The judgment of the District Court should therefore be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this / J 7

day of December, 2004.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

Clark Waddoups
Robert B. Lochhead
Attorneys for the Dunlaps
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This matter was remanded to the District Court by the Utah Court of Appeals for further
proceedings consistent with the ruling on appeal (No. 20010724-CA, 76P.3d 711). The Dunlap
plaintiffs thereafter filed a Motion for Pretrial Conference and Memorandum re Issues Remaining
for Determination Following Appeal, in which the Dunlap plaintiffs sought further factual and
legal determinations by this Court. The defendants opposed the plaintiffs' Motion and requested
immediate entry ofjudgment. The Court held a hearing on April 26,2004, to consider the
Dunlap plaintiffs' Motion and the defendants' opposition thereto. The Court having considered
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs' Motion for Pretrial Conference, the memoranda
submitted by the parties, the arguments of counsel, and all other pertinent matters of record; the
Court having determined that the matters raised by the Dunlap plaintiffs following remand are
either barred by the ruling of the Court of Appeals or by res judicata, and that the Court is
precluded from making findings of fact or conducting further proceedings on the matters raised
by the Dunlap plaintiffs; and for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing on April 26,2004;
the Court now enters the following Judgment:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Pretrial Conference is hereby denied.

2.

The chain of title of defendants Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds and

Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds to the Marsac Lode, Lot No. 61, located in the South half
of Section 21, Township 2, South, Range 4 East, SLBM, Summit County Utah, is superior to that
ofplaintiffs Dunlap or their grantee United Park City Mines Co; &~**< ^o jZ**f**C&*>**~+C
3.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish any claim to said Marsac Lode by adverse

possession.
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4.

Defendants are not barredfromasserting their title to said Marsac Lode by the

doctrine of estoppel in pais.
5.

Fee title to the Marsac Lode, Lot 61, South half of Section 21, SLBM, Summit

County, Utah, should be, and hereby is quieted in Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds as to a
120/175 interest and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds as to a 55/175 interest, as against
plaintiffs Dunlap and United Park City Mines Co. and all claiming by, through, or under them.
6.

The Complaint herein is hereby dismissed in entirety with prejudice and upon the

7.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

merits.
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2004.
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
Hi
This case comes before the court on appeal from a grant of
summary judgment for Plaintiffs, Robert W. Dunlap, Kathy L,
Dunlap, and United Park City Mines Company (collectively, the
Dunlaps)• Defendants, Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and
Mayflower Recreational Fonds (collectively, Mayflower) , appeal

Qb25~

the trial court1s grant of summary judgment quieting title to a
patented mining claim (the Marsac Lode)1 in Summit County, Utah,
in the Dunlaps. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
I.

Chain of Title to the Marsac Lode

^2
Both parties assert ownership of the Marsac Lode through
differing chains of title.
A.

Dunlaps1s Chain of Title

i|3
The Dunlaps assert that their chain of-title to the Marsac
Lode derives from numerous transfers, commencing April 30, 1932,
when Star of Utah Mining Company transferred, by recorded deed,
its interest in the Marsac Lode to New Park Mining Company of
Utah (New Park-Utah). Soon thereafter, on May 16, 1932, New
Park-Utah transferred, by recorded deed, its interest in the
Marsac Lode to New Park Mining Company of Nevada (New ParkNevada).2
1|4
On May 2, 1938, Park City Development Company (Park City
Development) deeded the Marsac Lode to International Smelting and
Refining Company (International Smelting),3 to secure repayment
of $3,000 Park City Development borrowed from International
Smelting to purchase the Marsac Lode from the "then owner."4
After 193 9, all taxes on the Marsac Lode were assessed to
International Smelting and its successors in interest.
%S On March 29, 1941, International Smelting brought suit to
foreclose the lien created by the May 2, 1938 deed with Park City
Development (1941 Foreclosure Action). The complaint, describing
1. The Marsac Lode consists of approximately five acres in the
Flagstaff Mountain area of Summit County, Utah, described as
Marsac Lode, Lot No. 61.
2. New Park-Utah and New Park-Nevada were incorporated within
days of each other and the same individuals sat on both
companiesf board of directors.
3. There is no recorded deed from New Park-Nevada or any other
person or entity to Park City Development for the Marsac Lode.
4. Through 1938 all taxes were assessed to New Park-Nevada and
both parties admit that as of May 2, 1938, New Park-Nevada was
the record owner of the Marsac Lode.
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all corporate defendants as Utah corporations, named both Park
City Development and "New Park Mining Company, a corporation, fl as
defendants. On the same day the complaint was filed, "New Park
Mining Company" disclaimed any interest in the Marsac Lode. The
court subsequently ordered a sheriff's sale of the Marsac Lode.
International Smelting was the highest bidder at the sheriff's
sale. On January 19, 1942, a Sheriff's Deed was issued,
conveying the Marsac Lode to International Smelting. In 1987,
Atlantic Richfield Company, a successor by merger of Anaconda
Company, which was in turn a successor by merger of International
Smelting, quitclaimed its interest in the Marsac Lode to AMI
Associates (AMI). All taxes were thereafter assessed to AMI.
Through two deeds dated April 18, 1994 and November 8, 1999, AMI
quitclaimed its interest in the Marsac Lode to the Dunlaps. All
taxes from 1993 to the present have been assessed to and paid by
the Dunlaps.
B.

Mayflower's Chain of Title

1J6 Mayflower's chain of title also originates from New ParkUtah's deed of the Marsac Lode to New Park-Nevada. However,
Mayflower argues that New Park-Nevada never divested its
ownership of the Marsac Lode until 1972, when it conveyed the
property by recorded deed to Lon Investment (Lon). In October
1981, a quitclaim deed was recorded conveying the Marsac .Lode
from Lon to Mayflower.
II.

Procedural History

%7
In July 200 0, the Dunlaps filed a complaint seeking to quiet
title to the Marsac Lode. The Dunlaps filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment asserting fee simple ownership of the Marsac Lode
through deeds from New Park Mining Corporation, International
Smelting, and AMI. Mayflower filed a Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment, asserting that their title to the property was superior
through deeds from New Park-Nevada and Lon.
^8
After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment
for the Dunlaps, and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order on December 20, 2001. Although concluding that the
Dunlaps could not establish a claim of adverse possession or
waiver, the court determined that the 1941 Foreclosure Action
foreclosed New Park-Nevada's interest in the Marsac Lode. The
court also concluded that New Park-Nevada's claim was barred by
estoppel in pais. The court ordered quiet title to the Marsac
Lode in the Dunlaps. Mayflower appeals.
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
%9
Mayflower appeals the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the Dunlaps, quieting title to the Marsac Lode in the
Dunlaps. "Summary judgment is granted only when 'there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact1 and 'the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.1" Bearden v. Croft,
2001 UT 76,15, 31 P.3d 537 (quoting Utah R. Civ, P. 56(c)). "In
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [this court] . . . gives
'no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: those
conclusions are reviewed for correctness.'" Id. (quoting Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989)).
ANALYSIS
HlO Mayflower contends that the trial court erred in determining
that the 1941 Foreclosure Action terminated New Park-Nevada's
interest in the Marsac Lode.5 "A quiet title action requires the
application of a rule of law to decide ownership of the property
in question." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2002
UT 3,^18, 5 P. 3d 1206. Where, as here, each party claims
ownership through different chains of title, "each party should
assume the burden of establishing by competent evidence its title
to the land respectively claimed." Music Serv. Corp. v. Walton,
20 Utah 2d 16, 432 P.2d 334, 336 (1967). We disagree with the
trial court's determination that Mayflower's claim was terminated
by the 1941 Foreclosure Action for two reasons: (1) Park City
Development did not have a recorded interest in the Marsac Lode
to transfer to International Smelting, and (2) foreclosure cannot
be used to eliminate the interest of one with a superior recorded
interest.
^11 Both parties agree that New Park-Nevada was the record owner
of the Marsac Lode in 1938, when the Park City Development deed
5, Mayflower also appeals the trial court's conclusion that they
are barred from asserting title by the doctrine of estoppel in
pais. See Financial Corp. of Am. v. Prudential Carbon & Ribbon
Co. , 29 Utah 2d 238, 507 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1973) C"[U]nder the
doctrine or principle of estoppel in pais one may by his acts or
conduct away from the court prevent himself from denying in court
the effect or result of those acts.'" (citation omitted)). The
trial court's Findings of Fact include no findings relating to
estoppel and the undisputed facts also do not support estoppel.
Furthermore, estoppel is inconsistent with the trial court's
determination that the Dunlaps had not established adverse
possession or waiver. We therefore reverse the trial court's
conclusion that Mayflower is estopped from claiming title.
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purporting to grant a mortgage interest to International Smelting
was created. However, no recorded deed exists between New ParkNevada and Park City Development for the Marsac Lode. In 1938,
the recording statute in effect was similar to Utah's current
race-notice statute.6 The former statute stated:
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter
made, which shall not be recorded as provided
in this title, shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a
valuable consideration of the same real
estate, or any portion thereof, where his own
conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
Utah R.S. § 78-3-3 (1933).7 Under this statute, only a recorded
deed from New Park-Nevada to Park City Development could have
protected Park City Development and those claiming under it from
recorded subsequent transfers by New Park-Nevada. Because there
is no such recorded deed, the Dunlaps's ownership claim is based
merely on a.stray title. See Greaerson v. Jensen, 669 P. 2d 396,
398 (Utah 1983) (stating buyers "did not obtain the statutory
protection enjoyed by subsequent purchasers . . . because they
did not qualify for that protection by recording their own
conveyance (or contract) as required by [section] 57-3-3. As a
result, the recording acts do not dictate the outcome of this
controversy" (footnote omitted)).
^12 The Dunlaps, however, argue that language in the deed from
Park City Development to International Smelting, referring to
Park City Development' s purchase of the Marsac Lode from the
"then owner, " could only mean that Park City Development
purchased the property and obtained a deed from New Park-Nevada.
However, a deed, if one ever existed, was never recorded. "[I]f
the grantee fails to record, he assumes the risk of a subsequent
6.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 (2000) states:
Each document not recorded as provided in
this title is void as against any subsequent
purchaser of the same real property, or any
portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the
property in good faith and for a valuable
consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is
first duly recorded.

7. The recording act and law of record priorities apply to
mortgages as well as to deeds. See Federal Land Bank of Berkeley
v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 P.2d 480, 482 (1935).
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grantee of the same land acquiring superior rights to his by
recordation.,f Horman v. Clark, 744 P. 2d 1014, 1016 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (quotations and citations omitted). Without a
recorded deed, we cannot determine that the transfer from New
Park-Nevada to Park City Development took place. It may just as
well have been that a third party fraudulently caused Park City
Development to believe they had purchased the Marsac Lode from
its "then owner." Regardless, when International Smelting
brought suit for foreclosure of the mortgage deed, an inspection
of the record would have provided notice to International
Smelting that the record owner of the Marsac Lode was New ParkNevada, not Park City Development. See U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A.
Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303,135, 990 P.2d 945 ("[C]onstructive
notice is imparted when documents are properly recorded.ff) .
Having no recorded deed to the Marsac Lode, Park City Development
had no protected title to transfer or mortgage as security for a
loan.
Kl3 Where no recorded deed exists between New Park-Nevada and
Park City Development, the 1941 Foreclosure Action could not
affect the record owner of the Marsac Lode, New Park-Nevada,
which was the holder of a superior recorded interest. First, the
record indicates New Park-Nevada was not properly named as a
party defendant. The complaint referred to.the corporate
defendants as Utah corporations--New Park-Nevada was a Nevada
corporation--and named only Park City Development and "New Park
Mining Company, a corporation," as defendants. When the holder
of a recorded interest is not joined in an action to foreclose,
the foreclosure does nothing to affect its interest in the
property. See Mickelson v. Anderson, 81 Utah 444, 19 P.2d 1033,
1036 (1932) ("Respondent, while seeking to foreclose her mortgage
. . . failed to effect a foreclosure because the owner of the
property was not a party to the action; hence the decree of
foreclosure was void and of no effect . . • . " ) ; see also Reader
v. District Court, 98 Utah 1, 94 P.2d 858, 861 (1939) (quoting
Mickelson).8
Hl4 This rule is applicable here. Because New Park-Nevada was
not properly named and joined as a party, the 1941 Foreclosure
Action could have no effect on New-Park Nevada's interest, which
was deeded to Mayflower through subsequent recorded transfers.
8. The Dunlaps argue that New Park-Nevada had actual knowledge
of the foreclosure action and did nothing to impede its progress.
This argument is based on New Park-Nevada and New Park-Utah
having the same individuals associated with both companies. Even
if knowledge gave rise to some sort of affirmative duty, the
argument is based on conjecture and not the extant record of the
foreclosure action.
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^15 Second, and most importantly, a mortgage foreclosure action
can only affect the interests of a mortgagor and others who hold
subsequent and inferior interests to the mortgagee.
The general rule is that a mortgage may be
foreclosed against the owner of the equity of
redemption or any person whose rights are
subordinate to the mortgage, but not against
one to whose rights the mortgage is subject,
for a foreclosure is not the proper
proceeding in which to litigate questions of
the mortgagor's title as against strangers to
the mortgage who claim a superior title
59 C-J.S. Mortgages § 550 (1998); see also 4 Richard R. Powell,
Powell on Real Property §37.37 [7] (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
Matthew Bender 2003) (" [S]enior interests cannot be affected by
the foreclosure [, ] . . . the rights of holders of paramount title
, . • are not within the scope of the action.ff) . Consequently, a
party with an interest superior to that of the mortgagee is not a
necessary party in a foreclosure action. See Graham v. Oakden,
51 Utah 476, 170 P. 451, 452 (1917) ("It is a fundamental
principle in proceedings to foreclose a mortgage that prior
lienors or incumbrancers are not necessary parties to the
proceedings."); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-3 (2002)
(addressing necessary parties in actions for mortgage
foreclosure). Furthermore, "an action to determine adverse
claims cannot be maintained against the holder of the legal title
by one who has a mortgage lien." Fields v. Cobbey, 22 Utah 415,
62 P. 1020, 1021 (1900). Here, Park City Development's interest
in*tt*e,Marsac Lode was subsequent and inferior to that of New
P#rk-Nevada. It is undisputed that New Park-Nevada owned the
$arsfac Lode pursuant to a recorded deed, prior to the time Park
<2itfr'^Development purported to mortgage its unrecorded interest to
^International Smelting. Therefore, International Smelting could
noo use its foreclosure action to extinguish New Park-Nevada's
superior title to the property. Even if International Smelting
had prpperly joined New Park-Nevada with the 1941 Foreclosure
Action, the court in the 1941*Foreclosure Action could not have
determined New Park-Nevada1 s interest in the Marsac Lode as it
was not a party to the mortgage and had title that was superior
to that T>f International Smelting. Consequently, the trial court
erred in determining that th^ 1941 Foreclosure Action foreclosed
New Park-Nevada's interest irj the Marsac Lode.
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CONCLUSION
Ul6 Mayflower's chain of title to the Marsac Lode is superior to
that of the Dunlaps. The Dunlaps's claim is through an
unrecorded transfer, which, by virtue of the recording act, is
inferior to the recorded transfers by which Mayflower holds title
to the property. Additionally, the 1941 Foreclosure Action did
not affect New Park-Nevada's interest in the Marsac Lode because
it was not properly joined as a party. Furthermore, the 1941
Foreclosure Action could not affect the interests of New ParkNevada as it had recorded title to the property that was superior
to that of the mortgagor, Park City Development. Therefore, the
Dunlaps's chain of title is flawed, and Mayflower's chain of
title is "establish[ed] by competent evidence." Music Serv.
Corp. v. Walton, 20 Utah 2d 16, 432 P.2d 334, 336 (1967).
Consequently, we reverse the decision of the trial court granting
summary judgment to the Dunlaps. We remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

^17

WE CONCUR:
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THE COURT:

In all candor, I think however I rule

today, I get—it's going back up almost certainly.

And that's

a pity because this has gone on for a lot of years in some
sense.
But I think where we're fundamentally different, Mr.
Lochhead, is not in what ideally should happen, not in what is
the best way for this to be addressed, given what was before
the Court; but in the res judicata effect and what that means.
And this Court is persuaded that all of the issues
that were or could have been considered at the time of the
summary judgment motion had been considered and concluded.
And that is one of the true principles of finality.
And I think Rule 56 is very important to consider
here.

There's significant case law, starting, Callio vs.

Progressive was in the discovery context of Rule 56(f), but
the court kept making its position and has since then, that
you either have your evidence or you identify what evidence
you will get or it's over.

It's time, basically, either to

fish or cut bait.
There is no issue here, including the good faith
purchaser for value that should not have been within the
contemplation of the parties and of cpunsel, that should not
have been considered or was not subsumed within the decisions
of this Court, then as modified and reversed by the Court of

30

1 j Appeals.
2

The Court finds that based on the record of this

3 J case, that there is nothing further to be determined, there is
4 J no issue for which we can apply—engage in further discovery
5 I and that Mr. Smay is correct, that his client is entitled to a
6

I judgment quieting title.

7

I

8

I but the issue was very much before the parties before the

9

J Court and I do not think that's available.

The issue of a counterclaim is an interesting issue,

They were

10 J defending their title and with the Court of Appeals' decision,
11 I this Court feels constrained to enter a judgment in their
12 J favor.
13 I

Mr. Smay is going to have to prepare a judgment,

14 J maybe the same one he already presented, but there does need
15 I to be a chance under the rule, as quick as we can, but they
16 I have the right to object or stipulate to it.
17 J

MR. SMAY:

I wouldn't have any intention to change

18 J it, but if there are objections (inaudible)
19

MR. LOCHHEAD:

20 I

THE COURT:

21

I'll take a look at the judgment.

(Inaudible) not.

You look at it and see

if you have an objection to the form of the order.

22 I sign off on it, great.

If you can

As I say, I think it's highly likely,

23 I given all the activity on this property, that you'll be
24 I looking at some way to get back to the Court; but that's the
25

reality.

We all know that.

Thank you all.
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